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I. INTRODUCTION
With the ease of international communication and travel, mar-
riages between foreign national citizens have increased.1  Conse-
quently, child custody issues upon a couple’s separation or divorce
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Sarah J. Kniep: JD Candidate, 2015, University of Nebraska College of Law; B.A.
University of Nebraska-Kearney, 2012.  I would first like to thank my husband,
Phil, for his continual encouragement, support, and understanding throughout
this entire Note writing process.  I would also like to thank the NEBRASKA LAW
REVIEW members for their help with developing, editing, and publishing this
Note.  The entire process has been an extremely challenging and rewarding
experience.
1. See PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. MCCLEAVY, THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON IN-
TERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 3 (1999).
750
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have also run rampant as one parent takes the child and flees to a
foreign nation.2  Each year, over one thousand children are parentally
abducted to or from the United States alone.3  The 1980 Hague Con-
vention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (1980
Hague Convention or Convention) was created to develop a solution to
this rapidly growing problem.4  In the company of over eighty na-
tions,5 the United States became party to the Convention in 1988, and
that same year it implemented the International Child Abduction Act
(ICARA).6  However, the Convention is silent on numerous jurisdic-
tional issues, such as an appeal of a return order after the child has
already returned to the foreign nation, leaving each country to its own
interpretation.  The United States Supreme Court attempted to clarify
this issue in its decision in Chafin v. Chafin.7
In order to comprehend the complexity of the issue at stake for this
case and the outcome of future cases, the Convention must be fully
examined.8 Chafin addresses the conflict between the Convention’s
stated goals of quick judicial resolution while avoiding competing judi-
cial resolution in different countries or, even worse, parents fleeing to
another country with more favorable custody laws.9  This is a source
of controversy both within the United States and other international
countries party to the Convention.  However, there are significant
weaknesses in the Chafin decision.
The Chafin case illustrates the need for uniformity in an expedited
appeals process that will ensure the proper recourse for a losing par-
ent, while also enabling finality and stability for the child.  As a start-
ing point in implementing more effective procedures on an appeal, this
Note suggests that courts should adopt a comparative law approach.
Such an approach will enable a court’s final decision, including an ap-
pellate decision, to be made within six weeks.  It is crucial that all
courts adhere to a more uniform standard in order to ensure the best
2. OFFICE OF CHILDREN’S ISSUES, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH
THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUC-
TION (2010), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/7KLJ-EBY9.
3. Id. at 14.
4. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct 25,
1980, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 (entered into force Dec. 1, 1983) [hereinafter 1980 Hague
Convention].
5. Status Table: Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, http://www.hcch
.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=24 (last updated Apr. 10, 2014),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/BU7G-962B.
6. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, Pub. L. No. 100-300, 102 Stat. 437
(1988) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§9001–9011 (2012)) [hereinafter ICARA].
7. 133 S. Ct. 1017 (2013).
8. See infra, subsection II.A.1 (discussing the Convention’s purposes and
provisions).
9. See infra, subsection II.B.2.
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interest of the child and cooperation among the other foreign nations
involved in the disputes.
This Note begins in Part II with the history and development of the
1980 Hague Convention and discusses the intricacies of the interna-
tional attempt to regulate parental child abductions.  Further, Part II
introduces the U.S. circuit court split regarding whether the losing
parent has the right to stay the proceedings while perfecting an ap-
peal.  As this Note explains, such an unpredictable judicial process
within different jurisdictions of the United States frustrates the over-
all purpose of the 1980 Hague Convention, impeding a foreign court’s
ability to take the case and offer finality to the parents and children
involved.  Finally, Part II introduces the Chafin decision, which ulti-
mately decided that, according to the right to due process of law under
the U.S. Constitution, a parent who loses the right to custody at the
trial level has the right to an appeal.  Part III analyzes the Chafin
decision, discussing the benefits of having a conclusive structure to
deal with 1980 Hague Convention appeals within the United States,
while also pointing to several issues that must be resolved before the
international system can become a fluid and cohesive unit.  Ulti-
mately, this Note suggests that while legislative action would be the
most effective means of change, the courts cannot wait for lawmakers
to act; they must have a plan to expedite procedures for the benefit of
the families involved in such international custody disputes.  It is im-
perative that the U.S. circuits have a plan of attack as the problem of
international custody disputes shows no signs of decreasing.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Hague Convention: Purposes and Provisions
The discussion of whether an appeal should be granted must first
begin with the 1980 Hague Convention, which is the source of author-
ity over international child abduction cases.  In 1988, the United
States implemented legislation to adopt the 1980 Hague Convention,
with ICARA.10  The Convention serves several key purposes.  First
and foremost, the Convention promotes the consideration of the best
interest of the child above all else.11  As one report explains, the Con-
vention’s philosophy realizes “the struggle against the great increase
in international child abductions must always be inspired by the de-
10. ICARA, supra note 6.  ICARA is effectively a mirror image of the Convention. R
11. The Preamble of the 1980 Hague Convention states clearly that the states ratify-
ing the treaty are, first, “[f]irmly convinced that the interests of children are of
paramount importance in matters relating to their custody,” and, second,
“[d]esiring to protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their
wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt
return to the State of their habitual residence, as well as to secure protection for
rights of access.”  1980 Hague Convention, supra note 4, at pmbl. R
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sire to protect children and should be based upon an interpretation of
their true interest.”12  Second, the Convention seeks to eliminate the
attractive temptation for one parent to flee to a foreign nation to ac-
cess more favorable custody laws.13  The Convention provides an ave-
nue by which two foreign nations can return the wrongfully removed
child to the country of habitual residence as swiftly as possible.14  The
Convention emphasizes the importance and necessity of both speed
and finality in the decision.15  Lastly, both of the foregoing goals ne-
cessitate the final purpose of promoting cooperation and deference be-
tween the two foreign nations.16  Without judicial deference or
cooperation, the orders within one nation would be meaningless, and a
final decision would be nearly impossible.  Thus, this final purpose is
gravely important to the Convention’s core goals.
The Convention is triggered when a child is wrongfully removed to
or retained in a foreign country,17 effectively giving a parent the abil-
12. Elisa Pe´rez-Vera, Explanatory Report on the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Con-
vention, in ACTS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE FOURTEENTH SESSION 426, ¶ 24 (1982)
[hereinafter, Pe´rez-Vera Report], archived at http://perma.unl.edu/5J63-XNCZ.
The report further states:
[T]he true victim of the childnapping [sic] is the child himself, who suf-
fers from the sudden upsetting of his stability, the traumatic loss of con-
tact with the parent who has been in charge of his upbringing, the
uncertainty and frustration which come with the necessity to adapt to a
strange language, unfamiliar cultural conditions and unknown teachers
and relatives.
Id. at 432 (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. 1980 Hague Convention, supra note 4, at art. 1(a). R
14. Id.  The Convention also provides limited exceptions to the return of a child. Id.
at arts. 13, 20.  The exception to return applies when: (1) the parent with legal
custody rights was either not exercising that right when the child was removed or
retained, or had agreed to the removal or retention; (2) a grave risk of a physical,
psychological, or other harm exists upon return; (3) the child is old enough and
mature enough to object to the return. Id.  One other exception is available when
the return “would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the re-
quested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental free-
doms.” Id. at art. 20.
15. See 1980 Hague Convention, supra note 4, arts. 1, 2, 7, 11.  The Convention spe- R
cifically states that expeditious proceedings must be taken by the Contracting
State and that a decision should be rendered within six weeks from the beginning
of the proceedings. Id. at art. 11.
16. 1980 Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 1 (stating the Convention’s goals are R
“to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting
State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States”); see also Pe´rez-
Vera Report, supra note 12, ¶ 35 (“Thus, the Convention on the Civil Aspects of R
International Child Abduction is above all a convention which seeks to prevent
the international removal of children by creating a system of close co-operation
among the judicial and administrative authorities of the Contracting States.”).
17. 1980 Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 3 (defining wrongful removal or reten- R
tion of a child when “it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a per-
son . . . under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident
immediately before the removal or retention”).
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ity to seek a return order for the child within the judicial or adminis-
trative system where the child is located.18  However, the Convention
maintains no authority to decide the merits of custody rights.19  Once
an order to return has been granted, custody proceedings begin in the
country of habitual residence.20  The country issuing the order, there-
fore, gives up jurisdiction of the matter completely.
The Convention and ICARA are both silent in regard to issuing
stays in a Convention case.21  Thus, significant issues arise when a
parent wishes to appeal a return order after both the denial of a stay
and the child’s physical return to the habitual residence.  Is the case
rendered moot upon the child’s return to the habitual residence?
Which country has jurisdiction over the matter?  The 1980 Hague
Convention does not address matters of appeals,22 thus, countries are
left to their own interpretation on how to implement the goals of the
Convention23 with an appropriate appellate procedure.
B. Circuit Split on Issue of Mootness
When deciding whether to stay an order, federal courts must use
the general law.24  Courts use four general factors to determine when
to allow an issuance of a stay:
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to
succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured
absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the
other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest
lies.25
The factors do not all have to be present in the case.  In practice,
courts generally find that a stronger showing on one factor will have
18. 1980 Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 8. R
19. 1980 Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 19. R
20. 1980 Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 16 (declaring that the country to R
which the child has been removed or retained “shall not decide on the merits of
rights of custody until it has been determined that the child is not to be returned
under this Convention or unless an application under this Convention is not
lodged within a reasonable time following receipt of the notice”).
21. A stay is the suspension, postponement, or halting by the court of a judicial
action.
22. The Convention does state “[w]here the judicial or administrative authority in
the requested State has reason to believe that the child has been taken to another
State, it may stay proceedings or dismiss the application for the return of the
child.”  1980 Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 12.  However, this article ad- R
dresses original return orders and not those on appeal.  Furthermore, the direc-
tion to stay or dismiss, even in a return order, is not mandatory, as the provision
states the State may stay or dismiss, not must.  Thus, whether or not an appeal
should be granted after a child has returned is left for the discretion of the States.
23. 1980 Hague Convention, supra note 4, at preamble, art. 1. R
24. FED. R. CIV. P. 62(C).
25. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987).
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the effect of balancing out weaker factors.26  With cases under the
Convention specifically, one court explained:
Staying the return of a child in an action under the Convention should hardly
be a matter of course.  The aim of the Convention is to secure prompt return of
the child to the correct jurisdiction, and any unnecessary delay renders the
subsequent return more difficult for the child, and subsequent adjudication
more difficult for the foreign court.27
This cautionary note created a reaction within the circuits about the
effect of a denial of a stay.  The Eleventh Circuit held that an appeal of
a denial of a stay was considered moot, while the Third and Fourth
Circuits decided the opposite.28
1. Bekier v. Bekier
The Eleventh Circuit was the first to provide a holding on the issue
of mootness on an appeal of a return order under the1980 Hague Con-
vention, in Bekier v. Bekier.29  Because the court was deciding an issue
of first impression, it had trouble finding supportive case law.  But the
court ultimately determined that an appeal of a return order after the
child had physically returned was considered moot.30
In the case, Mr. Bekier and Ms. Bekier were awarded joint and
legal custody of their only child, Jonathan.31  Mr. Bekier obtained
written permission from Ms. Bekier to take their son to Israel in order
to become temporary residents.32  Mr. Bekier filed a claim for custody
of his son in an Israeli court while Ms. Bekier was visiting, and was
granted permanent custody.33  Shortly after, Ms. Bekier fled with
their son and eventually relocated to Florida, while Mr. Bekier was
left without knowledge of his son’s whereabouts.34
After a private investigator located his ex-wife and son in Florida,
Mr. Bekier filed a petition for a return under the 1980 Hague Conven-
tion and ICARA.35  The Florida District Court determined that the
son was wrongfully removed from Israel, his country of habitual resi-
dence, and issued an order that the child be returned to Israel with
Mr. Bekier.36  Ms. Bekier was awarded a conditional stay if she filed
26. Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2004) (treating the application of
the factors “somewhat like a sliding scale”).
27. Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1063 n.1 (6th Cir. 1996).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 29–63. R
29. 248 F.3d 1051 (11th Cir. 2001), abrogated by Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017
(2013).
30. Id. at 1056.
31. Id. at 1052.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1052–53.
34. Id. at 1053.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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an appeal within ten days and posted a $100,000 bond.37  Ms. Bekier
timely appealed but did not post the bond, and Mr. Bekier and the
child returned to Israel.38  The Eleventh Circuit, however, held that
because the child had already returned to Israel, the United States no
longer had jurisdiction and the case was moot.39
The court rested its decision on cases where the courts literally had
no physical ability to grant effective relief at all.40  Using these cases
as guidance, the court determined that no relief could be granted since
the primary relief had already been granted after Jonathan had re-
turned to Israel.41  The court stated it had “no authority to give opin-
ions on moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare
principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the
case.”42  In dicta, the court noted, “We suppose we would have juris-
diction if [their son] had remained in the United States, either under
court order or for other reasons.”43  The court did admit that the “deci-
sion [to render the case moot] to some degree conflicts with the pur-
poses of the 1980 Hague Convention: to prevent parents from fleeing
jurisdictions to find a more favorable judicial forum and to return chil-
dren to their habitual residence in a timely fashion.”44  However, the
Eleventh Circuit ultimately dismissed this concern with the trump
card: the doctrine of mootness.45  This decision set the stage for
controversy.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1054.
40. See Westmoreland v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 833 F.2d 1461, 1463 (11th Cir.
1987) (finding the case moot because the original relief of reinstating a pilot’s
license had already been granted); B&B Chem. Co., Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 806 F.2d
987, 989 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding that a challenge to a warrant was moot on
appeal because the warrant had already been executed); In re Sewanee Land,
Coal & Cattle, Inc., 735 F.2d 1294 (11th Cir. 1984) (dealing with a bankruptcy
case in which a stay had not been issued and the disputed property was already
sold, leaving the court powerless to grant any form of relief).
41. Bekier, 248 F.3d at 1054.  The court specifically states that because of the failure
to obtain a stay, “we became powerless to grant the relief requested[,] . . . so we
must dismiss this appeal” as moot. Id. at 1055.
42. Id. at 1054 (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. Id. at 1055.
44. Id. The court also discussed Mr. Bekier’s argument that under the Sixth Circuit
guidance in Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060 (6th Cir. 1996), stays should not
be granted as a matter of course under the 1980 Hague Convention. Id. at 1055.
It dismissed this argument, noting that “this dicta by the Sixth Circuit does not
address the court’s jurisdiction or the possibility that a child’s exit from the
United States pending appeal, even if the exit is made with the district court’s
permission, renders the appeal moot.” Id.
45. Id.
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2. Fawcett v. McRoberts
Two years after the Bekier opinion, the Fourth Circuit held that an
appeal was not considered moot and the United States maintains ju-
risdiction even after the child has returned to the habitual resi-
dence.46  The facts of the case are similar to those in Bekier: Mr.
McRoberts and Ms. Fawcett were married in Scotland in 1986, and
had two children, only one of whom was at issue in this case.47  After
their divorce in 1998, custody proceedings were held in Scotland, and
eventually, Ms. Fawcett was granted an order by the same Scottish
court preventing Mr. McRoberts from taking their son to the United
States.48  However, shortly after the decree, Mr. McRoberts took his
son and moved to the United States and concealed their whereabouts
from Ms. Fawcett.49  Upon finding Mr. Fawcett and her son, Ms.
Fawcett filed a petition in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia under the 1980 Hague Convention and
ICARA, and the court granted her petition.50  The son was eventually
returned to Scotland.51
Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit, the Fourth Circuit strongly sup-
ported the policy to allow an appeal on such matters.  The court noted
that the “overwhelming majority of other courts have also evidenced
their agreement with this position by routinely considering the merits
of an appeal from an order returning a child to a foreign country, even
when compliance with the order has resulted in the child’s presence in
a foreign country.”52  The court determined that relief could be
granted on appeal, for “no law of physics would make it impossible for
Ms. Fawcett to comply with an order by the district court that she
return [her son] to the United States.”53
46. 326 F.3d 491, 497 (4th Cir. 2003), abrogated by Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1
(2010).
47. Id. at 492.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Ohlander v. Larson, 114 F.3d 1531, 1538–39 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding that
just because the child had moved did not render the case moot and if it had ac-
cepted such arguments parents would be more likely to escape judgment by tak-
ing their children out of the court’s jurisdiction); Janakasis-Kostun v. Janakakis,
6 S.W.3d 843 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999) (deciding the merits of the appeal even after a
child had returned on a court order to the Greece); see also Rydder v. Rydder, 49
F.3d 369 (8th Cir. 1995) (reviewing merits of appeal even after child had returned
to country of habitual residence); Dalmasso v. Dalmasso, 9 P.3d 551 (Kan. 2000)
(same); Sampson v. Sampson, 975 P.2d 1211 (Kan. 1999) (same); Harkness v.
Harkness, 577 N.W.2d 116 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (same).
53. Fawcett, 326 F.3d at 496.  In fact, the opinion goes on to solidify that not only
would it be possible to grant relief, but “such orders are fully within the district
court’s power and are commonly issued in the United States.” Id.
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The Fourth Circuit concluded that even though the United States
might not possess a way to enforce the court order in a foreign nation,
the court’s decision still “affect[s] the matter in issue” and the case
cannot be considered moot.54  The opinion methodically waded
through the potential outcomes after a re-return had been granted, all
of which would “affect the matter at issue.”55  Thus, the Fourth Cir-
cuit held the case was not moot, and effectively created the circuit
split on the matter.
3. Whiting v. Krassner
The Third Circuit was thus faced with two contrary opinions when
deciding Whiting v. Krassner in 2004.56  The facts of the Whiting case
are similar in nature to both Bekier and Fawcett.  Ms. Whiting and
Mr. Krassner, though never married, had a daughter together in New
York in 2000.  Within a year, their relationship deteriorated, and they
created a custody agreement, which in pertinent part allowed Ms.
Whiting to take the daughter to Canada until 2003.57  In December
2001, Mr. Krassner came to Canada to spend time with his daughter
over the Christmas holiday.58  However, Mr. Krassner took their
daughter back to New York, without Ms. Whiting’s consent.59  Ms.
Whiting immediately filed a petition under the 1980 Hague Conven-
tion for the return of their daughter to Canada.60  The court had to
consider “whether changes in circumstances that prevailed at the be-
ginning of the litigation have forestalled any occasion for meaningful
relief.”61
However, in its determination, the court rejected the Bekier opin-
ion, criticizing its reliance on case law with largely different fact pat-
54. Id. (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Church of Scientology of Califor-
nia v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992)) (“As an initial matter, it is not at all
clear to us that a lack of effective methods for enforcing a court order necessarily
means that the court’s opinion ‘cannot affect the matter in issue.’” (quoting
Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. at 12)).  The order issuing re-return “would per-
mit Mr. McRoberts to appear in the Scottish courts simply to seek enforcement of
the United States judgment, rather than re-argue the merits of any custody dis-
pute respecting Travis.” Id.
55. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court reasoned that though the for-
eign nation may refuse to enforce the order, Ms. Fawcett herself “could comply
with the court’s order of her own volition.” Id. And even if she refused to comply,
“[s]he could be held in contempt, and penalties could be assessed.” Id.  Finally,
Ms. Fawcett might very well return to the United States and “Mr. McRoberts
could seek to enforce such an order.” Id.  The court did have power to grant relief,
even if noncompliance of the order became an issue. Id.
56. Whiting v. Krassner, 391 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2004).
57. Id. at 542.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 544 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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terns,62 and adopted the rationale of the Fourth Circuit in Fawcett.63
The Third Circuit recognized that “[n]othing has occurred during the
pendency of this appeal that makes it impossible for the court to grant
any effectual relief whatever.”64  Thus, the court in Whiting created a
majority view within emerging case law regarding mootness of appeal,
but the split was an issue that ultimately had to be settled in the
United States Supreme Court.
C. Chafin Facts and Decision
1. Facts and Procedural History
Jeffrey Lee Chafin is a United States citizen and a Sergeant First
Class in the United States Army.65  He met his wife, Lynne Hales
Chafin, a citizen of the United Kingdom, when he was stationed in
Germany.66  In March 2006, the couple married in Scotland and lived
together in Germany.67  One year later, their daughter E.C. was born,
and several months afterwards Mr. Chafin was deployed to Afghani-
stan.68  During Mr. Chafin’s fifteen-month tour of duty, Ms. Chafin
took E.C. to Scotland where both mother and daughter remained de-
spite Mr. Chafin’s return to Germany.69  In February 2009, Mr.
Chafin was transferred to Huntsville, Alabama, and Ms. Chafin and
E.C. joined him in an attempt to find a suitable home.70  Ms. Chafin
remained in Alabama with Mr. Chafin until late in 2010, when she
was arrested for domestic violence.71  The arrest alerted officials that
Ms. Chafin’s visa had expired and she was deported to Scotland in
February 2011.72
On May 2, 2011, Ms. Chafin filed a petition in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama seeking the prompt return
of E.C. to Scotland under the 1980 Hague Convention and ICARA.73
62. Id. at 545.  The Third Circuit opinion rejected the analysis of Bekier, stating that
“the court relied on cases in which the actions of the lower court simply could not
be undone by the appellate court or in which the appellant had already received
the relief he or she was seeking during the pendency.” Id.  In fact, the Third
Circuit further stated that “these cases are inapposite and should not have been
controlling because the return of a child under The Hague Convention is still
being contended by the losing party and relief can be granted.” Id.
63. Id. at 545.
64. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1022 (2013).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. From the time Ms. Chafin left the United States until May 2011, Mr. Chafin
was the sole caregiver and provider for their daughter, E.C. Id.
73. Id.
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At that time, a custody proceeding pending in an Alabama state trial
court was stayed pending the resolution of the federal suit.74  The fed-
eral district court held a bench trial on October 11–12, 2011, orally
finding in favor of the return of E.C. to Scotland.75  Ms. Chafin re-
turned to Scotland with E.C. that same day.76  The custody proceed-
ings in Alabama were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and Ms.
Chafin began custody proceedings in Scotland.77  Mr. Chafin timely
filed a notice of appeal.78
In February 2012, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Mr. Chafin’s ap-
peal as moot, determining that once a child has been returned to a
foreign country in compliance with a court order, a United States
court becomes powerless to grant relief.79  The Eleventh Circuit re-
manded the case to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the
suit as moot and vacate its order.80  However, on May 7, 2012, Mr.
Chafin petitioned for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the
United States, which was granted on August 13, 2012.  On February
19, 2013, the Supreme Court issued its unanimous order to vacate the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and to remand the case.81  From the
beginning of the court proceedings until the decision of the U.S. Su-
preme Court, nearly two years passed, and the case still lacked a final
decision.
2. Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority in Chafin, Chief Justice Roberts rejected
the Eleventh Circuit opinion and effectively sided with the Third and
Fourth Circuits, granting an appeal even when the child had returned
to a foreign country.  The Court’s analysis was based on several key
components: first, whether a case or controversy continued to exist
even after E.C.’s return to Scotland; second, whether the Court had
sufficient authority to grant relief of a re-return; third, whether either
Scotland or Ms. Chafin’s refusal to comply with the re-return order
rendered the case moot on appeal; and finally, whether the 1980
Hague Convention’s goals restricted the authority to hear the case on
appeal.
74. Id.
75. Id. Immediately after the oral ruling, Mr. Chafin moved the district court to stay
its order pending appeal, but the court denied his motion. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. The Scottish court granted Ms. Chafin interim custody and a preliminary
injunction, which prohibits Mr. Chafin from taking E.C. out of Scotland. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. (relying heavily the decision in Bekier, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the
appeal as moot in a one paragraph order).
80. Id. at 1023.
81. Id. at 1028.
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Initially, the Court quickly concluded that a live case and contro-
versy undoubtedly existed even after E.C.’s return to Scotland; Mr.
Chafin desired custody of E.C. in the United States, while Ms. Chafin
was fighting for custody in Scotland.82  There was little doubt that an
ongoing interest and dispute remained in the case as the main issue of
whether E.C. should return to Scotland.  Secondly, the Court recog-
nized that an appeals court has sufficient authority to grant relief of a
re-return.83  The Court reasoned that Ms. Chafin’s argument “con-
fuses mootness with the merits.”84  Mr. Chafin’s claim for the re-re-
turn of his child “cannot be dismissed as so implausible that it is
insufficient to preserve jurisdiction[,] . . . and his prospects of success
are therefore not pertinent to the mootness inquiry.”85  The relief
sought by Mr. Chafin is normal within appellate proceedings.  He sim-
ply desired the reversal of the lower court’s opinion, which is one of
the typical types of relief sought in an appeal.  The “[j]urisdiction to
correct what had been wrongfully done must remain with the court so
long as the parties and the case are properly before it, either in the
first instance or when remanded to it by an appellate tribunal.”86
Even though Mr. Chafin’s daughter was no longer in the United
States, according to the inherent framework of the United States judi-
cial system, the request for relief remained in the jurisdiction of the
appellate court.
Third, Ms. Chafin argued that even if an appeal were allowed and
the District Court granted a re-return order, she would ignore the or-
der and relief would ultimately be ineffectual, therefore rendering the
case moot.87  However, the Supreme Court rejected this logic—and
that found in the Bekier opinion—and determined that even if Scot-
land ignored the re-return order, the U.S. courts maintained jurisdic-
82. Id. at 1024.  The Court recognizes that both parties “vigorously contest the ques-
tion of where their daughter will be raised” and determines that “there is not the
slightest doubt that there continues to exist between the parties ‘that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues.’” Id. (citations omitted)
(quoting Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2028 (2011)).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.  See also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 500 (1969) (stating that the
argument confused mootness with the power of the plaintiff to recover, “a ques-
tion which [the Court] is inappropriate to treat at this stage of the litigation”).  In
other words, at this point, the Court is not deciding whether to grant a re-return
order.  Instead, the sole job of the Court is to determine whether live controversy
remains.  The Court already determined that “there is not the slightest doubt
that there continues to exist between the parties that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues.” Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1024.  Thus, Ms.
Chafin’s argument that Mr. Chafin will not succeed, are “not pertinent to the
mootness inquiry.” Id.
86. Nw. Fuel Co. v. Brock, 139 U.S. 216, 219 (1891).
87. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1024.
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tion over the case.88  The Court determined that it was not completely
powerless to issue a re-return order, for while the child is still alive,
and controversy continues over the case, it is possible to grant a form
of relief, even if Ms. Chafin would ignore it.89  In general, the Court
noted, courts often grant relief even where compliance with the order
is uncertain.90
The Court finally found that the 1980 Hague Convention’s goals
promote, rather than restrict, the authority of courts to hear an ap-
peal.91  If the parties had no opportunity to receive relief after the
child had left the country, “courts would be more likely to grant stays
as a matter of course, to prevent the loss of any right to appeal.”92  If
courts continually granted stays to children in order to preserve the
right to appeal, the 1980 Hague Convention’s ultimate goal to pursue
best interest of the child would be shattered because they would be
forced to stay in a country when they could be “readjusting to life in
[their] country of habitual residence, even though the appeal had little
chance of success.”93  Furthermore, if stays were granted more fre-
quently, the number of appeals would likely increase because parents
in a losing situation would file an appeal simply to prolong the return
of the child to the foreign country of habitual residence.94  Or on the
other side of the matter, parents who are granted a return of their
child would be likely to immediately comply with the order so as to
render the case moot.95  Both actions undermine the 1980 Hague Con-
vention’s intentions to pursue the best interest of the child.
88. Id. at 1025.
89. Id. The Court reasoned that the future is unpredictable and it is actually physi-
cally possible to grant the relief sought by Mr. Chafin, for “no law of physics pre-
vents E.C.’s return from Scotland.” Id.  Furthermore, the Court reasoned that
Ms. Chafin may actually comply with the order and return the child to the United
States, but if not, courts have the power to issue sanctions with the parties who
refuse to comply with the order.  Id.  In essence, the court maintained the author-
ity to provide effective relief in the case.
90. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (denying Austria’s mo-
tion to dismiss when a U.S. citizen sought to recover paintings stolen from her
family by the Nazis or expropriated by Austria); Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504
U.S. 607 (1992) (denying Argentina’s motion to dismiss when bondholders
brought a suit against the country for repayment of bonds); United States v. Vil-
lamonte–Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983) (finding that even though defendants had
been deported and the impact of the decision was uncertain, the defendants
might enter the country by their own accord and subject themselves to the order).
91. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1027 (“There is no need to manipulate constitutional doc-
trine and hold these cases moot.  Indeed, doing so may very well undermine the
goals of the treaty and harm the children it is meant to protect.”).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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The Court did note that one of the most central goals of the 1980
Hague Convention had not been met, as six-year-old E.C. was still
without finality of a decision of habitual residence.96  But while the
opinion emphasized that expedition of 1980 Hague Convention cases
is necessary, the Court indicated that a lack of expeditious court pro-
ceedings has no effect on mootness.97
3. Concurring Opinion
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer, con-
curred in the opinion and offered compelling suggestions for future
legislative reformation.  First, the opinion noted the incredible impor-
tance of complying with the 1980 Hague Convention’s main goals to
ensure both a speedy return of children and cooperation among the
foreign nations.98  When disputes involve young children, the lack of
expedited procedures produces the potential for some children to
spend a large percentage of their lives in legal limbo.99  The threat of
potential re-return creates instability within the home and judicial
system.  In order for courts in other countries to respect and imple-
ment the decisions of the United States judicial system, finality is
crucial.100
Ginsburg pointed out that the England and Wales judicial system
has a method that expedites procedures within a reasonable time
frame.101  This creates an environment in which stays are granted
more readily, for the entire proceeding generally takes less than sev-
eral months.102  Both parents and children are assured that a final
decision can be rendered so proper custody proceedings can commence
in the country of habitual residence.  Finally, Ginsburg urged both leg-
96. Id. at 1028 (“Cases in American courts often take over two years from filing to
resolution; for a six-year-old such as E.C., that is one-third of her lifetime.”)
97. Id. at 1027 (“There is no need to manipulate the constitutional doctrine and hold
these cases moot.”).  While the Court noted that courts “can and should take steps
to decide these cases as expeditiously as possible,” the majority opinion did not
address potential solutions to those unfortunate situations in which the courts
fail to expedite procedures. Id.
98. Id. at 1029–30 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). See 1980 Hague Convention, supra
note 4. R
99. Id. at 1030 (noting that if children were to wait several years before the finality of
their residence was established, it would essentially put their lives in limbo for a
substantial amount of their lives to that point).
100. A judge of the Family Division of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales
did not consider the re-return order to be binding in light of England’s jurisdic-
tion in the matter.  DL v. EL, [2013] EWHC (Fam) 49, [59] (Judgt. of Jan. 17).
The judge reasoned that to prolong the finality of a decision is to risk ineffectual
results and a lack of cooperation among the Contracting States.
101. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1030 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). See DL v. EL, [2013]
EWHC (Fam) 49 (proceedings in England describing a swift and final decision-
making process).
102. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1030 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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islatures and courts to implement the foreign guidance as it allows for
appeals and also disposes of the case as quickly and neatly as
possible.103
III. ANALYSIS
The Chafin decision clarified the case law on 1980 Hague Conven-
tion cases, declaring that cases on appeal of a return order are not
moot when the child has already returned to the country of habitual
residence.104  In support of its decision, the Court stated that to de-
clare an issue moot would be contrary to the 1980 Hague Conven-
tion.105  However, from the beginning of the proceedings until the
Supreme Court decision, nearly two years had passed, and still no fi-
nal decision had been issued.  One of the 1980 Hague Convention’s
main concerns is for children to be promptly returned to their country
of habitual residence.106  Two years within the legal system without a
final holding is far too long.107  With the ease of international travel
and increased parental abductions,108 the United States has a sub-
stantial motivation to promote speedy and final decisions to preserve
the best interest of the children involved in the disputes.  Not only will
prompt resolution of the cases comply with the 1980 Hague Conven-
tion’s main goal of speed and finality, but also will clear dockets more
quickly, ensure greater stability for the children and parents involved,
and increase cooperation by the foreign nation.  The Chafin opinion
alone, however, does not give specific guidelines to implement expe-
dited procedures.  Strict standards must be implemented and enforced
in 1980 Hague Convention court proceedings in order to fully comply
with its need for speed.
A. Future Application of Chafin
Because of Chafin, parents involved in 1980 Hague Convention
proceedings within the United States can rest assured that if they are
103. Id.
104. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1028.
105. Id. at 1027 (noting that stays would be issued as a matter of course and “would
conflict with the Convention’s mandate of prompt return to a child’s country of
habitual residence”).
106. 1980 Hague Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 1, 2, 7, 11. R
107. See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 2010, GUIDE TO GOOD
PRACTICE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL AS-
PECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION, Part IV-Enforcement, § 2.2, at 13
(2010) [hereinafter GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE] (“There should be strict time
frames for courts to process appeals against return orders.  Enforcement proceed-
ings should also be conducted expeditiously.”).  Furthermore, the guide notes that
the expeditious proceedings “also extend[ ] to appeal procedures.” Id. at § 2.2, ¶
51, at 13.
108. OFFICE OF CHILDREN’S ISSUES, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, supra note 2. R
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the losing party, they have the right to an appeal even after their child
leaves the country.  Of course, Chafin is highly important as it eases
concerns where the denial of a stay is concerned or where the winning
parent immediately returns to the country with the child.  Though
Chafin is a definite victory for losing parents, in reality, the opinion
actually has very little legal significance for parents who wish to actu-
ally use an appeals process.  Without further implementation of expe-
dited procedures, the opinion is meaningless.
First of all, the majority opinion in Chafin briefly touches on the
subject of time.109  Future courts applying the Chafin decision on an
appeal are left with little guidance except that they “should take steps
to decide these cases as expeditiously as possible.”110  This is essen-
tially meaningless.  Court proceedings in the United States can take
more than two years before a final decision is rendered.111  An expedi-
tious proceeding to one court could be determined to be any amount of
time less than the two-year norm, while another could define expedi-
tious to be no longer than a year, while yet another court could say six
months or six weeks.  The 1980 Hague Convention stresses the impor-
tance of prompt decisions within six weeks, which includes time for
appeals.112  Without uniform standards, the time from the beginning
of the proceedings until resolution could still be too long to affect any
form of relief.
One of the obstacles a parent would face without expedition is the
decision on the merits of a case.  Even though a future appeal will not
be considered moot, the time the child lives in the country while the
appeal was pending will be considered when deciding the merits of an
appeal, compounding the burden the losing parent must overcome.113
Appreciating the complexity of considerations courts use to determine
habitual residence is key to understanding this argument.
Under the Convention, courts have tried to “resist the temptation
to develop detailed and restrictive rules as to habitual residence,
which might make it as technical a term of art as common law domi-
109. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1026–28.
110. Id. at 1027.
111. Id.
112. 1980 Hague Convention, supra note 4, at art. 11. See GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE, R
supra note 107, § 2.2, ¶ 50, at 13. R
113. The defenses to a return are limited and apply only when: (1) the parent with
legal custody rights was either not exercising that right when the child was re-
moved or retained, or had agreed to the removal or retention; (2) a grave risk of a
physical, psychological, or other harm exists upon return; (3) the child is old
enough and mature enough to object to the return.  1980 Hague Convention,
supra note 4, at art. 13.  One other exception is available when the return “would R
not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to
the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Id. at art. 20.
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cile.”114  Instead, they are more likely to view each case based on the
individual facts and circumstances, rather than a standard set of
rules.  Though each case is determined on an individual basis, courts
have created basic guidelines to follow.  The Third Circuit has
presented compelling case law, stating that “a determination of
whether any particular place satisfie[d] this standard must focus on
the child and consists of an analysis of the child’s circumstances in
that place and the parents’ present, shared intentions regarding their
child’s presence there.”115
A majority of courts have agreed that habitual residence is a bal-
ance of the child’s intent and parental intent; the younger the child
the more weight is given to the parental intent and vice versa.116
When the child is too young to have the ability to have the intent to
change his or her habitual residence, the court shifts its attention to
the settled purpose of the “person or persons entitled to fix the place of
residence.”117  However, when the child is old enough to become accli-
mated to the environment and establish a new habitual residence, his
or her perspective will have more weight in the decision.118  There-
fore, the two different approaches could combine throughout the ap-
peals process.
In Chafin, the trial court originally found in favor of a return to
Scotland.119  At that time, because E.C. was of a young age, the stan-
dard to overcome was the shared intent of the parents since E.C. was
unable to form her own intent.  Mr. Chafin was unsuccessful at the
trial level.120  To make matters worse, after the Supreme Court deci-
sion, over two years had passed since the initial proceedings, and E.C.
was living in Scotland for over a year pursuant to the return order.121
Given this passage of time, the likelihood of success on appeal be-
comes much more diminished.  Mr. Chafin will first be required to pro-
vide evidence that the original order should be reversed, based on the
parental intent of where the habitual residence should be.  But E.C. is
now six years old, and is much more likely to form her own opinions.
She may have become acclimated to Scotland with the intent to estab-
lish it as her habitual location.  Mr. Chafin will have a seemingly in-
surmountable burden to prove that habitual residence should be the
United States.  The Chafin opinion is meaningless on the merits of the
114. In re Bates, No. CA 122-89, High Court of Justice, Family Div’n Ct. Royal Court
of Justice, United Kingdom (1989) (unreported).
115. Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 1995).
116. See, e.g., Larbie v. Larbie, 690 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2012); Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d
1067 (9th Cir. 2001); Feder, 63 F.3d 217.
117. Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1076.
118. Feder, 63 F.3d at 224.
119. Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1022 (2013).
120. Id.
121. Id.
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appeal, for it does not ensure speedy and final decision, which could
affect the court’s holding on appeal.
More importantly, even if a parent were to win on appeal, a re-
return order is likely to be ignored.  Without proper expeditious proce-
dures in place, foreign countries are much less willing to enforce a re-
return order.  Once a court issues a return order and the child is phys-
ically returned to the country of habitual residence, the country of ha-
bitual residence immediately gains jurisdiction of all custody
proceedings.122  If an order of re-return is demanded, the country of
habitual residence is not likely to enforce the order since jurisdiction
of all custody matters were granted along with the original return
order.
This situation is more than a mere threat, but has already proved
to be a substantial obstacle.123  In one recent case, the father won on
appeal and a re-return order was issued.124  However, the mother had
already initiated custody proceedings in the English and Welsh courts
upon the child’s return.125  Though the court in England and Wales
did not completely ignore the re-return order, it stated that the Texas
court no longer had jurisdiction over the matter because the child had
“ceased to be a habitual resident.”126  The court in England and Wales
disposed of the matter, finally stating that “[t]he concept of automatic
re-return of a child in response to the overturn of the Hague order
pursuant to which he came here is unsupported by law or principle,
and would . . . be deeply inimical to [the child’s] best interests.”127
The father was granted relief by the Texas court by a re-return order,
but in reality, the court order meant nothing.  The victory was point-
less.  Of course, Chafin attempts to lay out the possibilities in which
the order could potentially grant relief,128 but such hypothetical con-
clusions are an academic approach, which does nothing to effectuate
change.  The real and imminent risk of rival custody proceedings and
conflicting judgments can only be resolved with actual guidance and
structure of 1980 Hague Convention appeals.
Clearly, the Chafin opinion alone is meaningless unless some stan-
dards are implemented ensuring expedited procedures in 1980 Hague
Convention cases.  Without proper expedited procedures, parents who
have the guaranteed right to an appeal will likely still lose the appeal
122. See supra section II.A.
123. For an example of concurrent proceedings in Texas and the court in England and
Wales in disagreement over the effect of a re-return order, see Larbie v. Larbie,
690 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2012); DL v. EL, [2013] EWHC (Fam) 49.
124. Larbie, 690 F.3d at 312.
125. DL v. EL, [2013] EWHC (Fam) 49.
126. Id. at ¶ 59(a), (b).
127. Id. at ¶ 59(e).
128. Chafin v Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1024–26 (2013) (arguing that the Court can
order sanctions against Ms. Chafin or she may decide to comply with the order).
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on the merits as time compounds the complexity in the determination
of habitual residence.  But even if a parent were successful on the
merits of the claim, a re-return order is not likely to be enforced after
any amount of substantial time has lapsed between the initial order of
return and the appeals procedure.  Strict time frames must be put in
place in order for parents to fully benefit from the Chafin decision.
B. Adoption of the English and Welsh Approach to Appeals
The United States must implement some concrete guidelines in the
1980 Hague Convention appeals process in order to eliminate the risk
of being ineffectual by promoting cooperation among other foreign na-
tions.  Clearly, the Chafin opinion alone is ineffective.129  A proactive
solution must be implemented in order to prevent conflicting judg-
ments.130  Speed is the key to success in 1980 Hague Convention
cases,131 and “there should be strict time frames for courts to process
appeals against return orders.”132  In fact, the 1980 Hague Conven-
tion mandates that proceedings should be completed within six
weeks.133  With decisions like Chafin extending the time frame for
proceedings for over two years, the United States clearly needs con-
crete guidelines in place.  In her concurring opinion in Chafin, Justice
Ginsburg briefly touched on the prospect of implementing an expe-
dited appellate procedure similar to that used in the English and
Welsh judicial systems.134  A closer inspection of the procedure lends
valuable guidance for the United States, and should be implemented
through both the judicial action and ultimately the legislative
adoption.
The English and Welsh system follows the 1980 Hague Conven-
tion’s guidance of expediting procedures to be resolved within a time
frame target of six weeks.135  In all 1980 Hague Convention proceed-
ings, “an effort is made to ensure that the six-week period includes the
appellate process.”136  England and Wales recognize that the six-week
time frame as “an important feature of the Hague landscape.”137  The
courts in England and Wales understand that the short time frame for
resolving 1980 Hague Convention cases allows for compliance with its
129. See supra section III.A.
130. See supra text accompanying note 123–27. R
131. See GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE, supra note 107, § 2, ¶ 41, at 11. R
132. GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE, supra note 107, § 2.2, at 13. R
133. 1980 Hague Convention, supra note 4, at art. 11. R
134. Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1028–31 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
135. 1980 Hague Convention, supra note 4, at art. 12. R
136. Brief of the Centre for Family Law and Policy as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 20, Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017 (2013) (No. 11-1347), 2012
WL 5451451.
137. Id.
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main provision.138  However, it is important to note that while the six-
week time frame is extremely important, England and Wales recog-
nize that “this can only be achieved with the fullest cooperation of the
parties.”139  Not every case can be resolved in such a short time, but
England and Wales ensure that the proper steps are in place in order
to eliminate all the procedural delays that wreak havoc in U.S. courts.
The first step toward expedited procedure is to require a leave for
appeal.  The English and Welsh judicial system requires leave for ap-
peal, which can only be granted by the trial judge or the Court of Ap-
peal.140  England and Wales only allow leave when “the appeal would
have a real prospect of success; or . . . there is some other compelling
reason why the appeal should be heard.”141  This practice of requiring
leave for appeal is not uncommon, even within the United States.142
In fact, implementing a requirement of a leave, if implemented cor-
rectly, has been noted to expedite procedures.143  Of course, courts
should avoid at all costs any delays in issuing the leave for appeal, for
a delay would undermine the entire purpose of requiring a leave in the
first place.  Thus, the optimal court to grant a leave is the trial court
that issued the order in the first place.144
Next, the court must decide whether to issue a stay on the return
order upon a leave for appeal.  Courts in England and Wales typically
issue a stay, although it is not mandatory.145  This is perhaps one of
the greatest concerns of the Chafin court, as the majority opinion
based the decision to allow an appeal on the fact that stays should
only be rendered on a case-by-case basis and never as a matter of
course.146  This is a proper and normal reaction of many courts within
138. Id. at 20–21 (noting the main provision of the Convention is “to protect children
from the harmful effects of child abduction and promptly return them to their
state of habitual residence”).
139. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom: Practice Direction 3, ¶ 3.4.4.
140. Family Procedure Rules 2010, Rule 30.3 (U.K.).
141. Id.
142. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2012) (no appeal from a case under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(2012) can be taken from a final judgment of the trial court without first being
granted a certificate from a circuit justice or judge).
143. GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE, supra note 107, ¶¶ 65–67, at 16–17.  The Guide sug- R
gests that if a leave for appeal were required, that the trial court making the
initial order should decide whether the case has leave for appeal. Id. at ¶ 67.  The
Guide also suggests if the appellate court decides, the process should be as speedy
and efficient as possible so that no delays in obtaining information undermine the
process. Id.
144. Id. at ¶¶ 66–67, at 16–17.  Where the appeals court must issue a leave for appeal,
courts should ensure that the courts use the most efficient method of transferring
case files. Id.
145. Id. at ¶ 74, at 19–20, n.111.
146. Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1027 (2013).
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United States when dealing with Convention cases.147  Yet, because of
the requirement for leave of appeals compounded with other efforts to
ensure expedited procedures, English and Welsh proceedings are far
less likely to encounter the grave consequences of issuing a stay.148
Though leave for appeal does not automatically trigger an issuance
of a stay, the English and Welsh courts have discretion to issue stays
where they may be required.149  The process still allows for discretion
when issuing a stay on a court-by-court basis.  It is important for the
United States to note, however, that even though stays are normally
granted in English and Welsh procedures, “an automatic stay proce-
dure is not necessary if coupled with an expedited appellate structure”
because the decision will be final within six-week time frame.150  In
other words, even if an automatic stay procedure were implemented,
the practice of granting stays is far less detrimental than the issuance
of a re-return order after several years’ time.151  The short time frame
would not allow courts within the habitual residence to begin proceed-
ings if the child did return within the appellate proceedings, and con-
flicting judgments would be avoided.  The main concerns of the U.S.
courts would be completely removed.  Therefore, the danger in issuing
stays that courts have tried to avoid in past decisions is completely
eliminated.
Next, the English and Welsh appeals process expedites procedures
to ensure a final decision within six weeks’ time.152  Expedited proce-
dures are actually common in a majority of U.S. circuits.153  In one
example, Charalambous v. Charalambous,154 the court ordered a
child be returned to the country of habitual residence.  However, in-
stead of a process dragging out for months and years, the First Circuit
issued a stay of the order on October 28, 2010.155  The appeal was
expedited and oral argument was held shortly over one month later on
147. See, e.g., Whiting v. Krassner, 391 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2004); Fawcett v. McRoberts,
326 F.3d 491 (4th Cir. 2003); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1063 n.1 (6th
Cir. 1996).
148. Brief of the Centre for Family Law and Policy as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 20, Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017 (2013) (No. 11-1347), 2012
WL 5451451.
149. Id. at 22.
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., Larbie v. Larbie, 690 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 2012) (issuing of a re-return
order was unenforceable in the Scotland court where rival custody proceedings
were taking place).
152. Brief of the Centre for Family Law and Policy as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent, supra note 148, at 24.
153. J. GARBOLINI, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER INT’L LITIGATION GUIDE, THE 1980
HAGUE CONVENTION ON CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION: A
GUIDE FOR JUDGES 116 (2012).
154. 627 F.3d 462 (1st Cir. 2010).
155. Id.
35748-neb_93-3 Sheet No. 117 Side A      04/02/2015   08:48:02
35748-neb_93-3 Sheet No. 117 Side A      04/02/2015   08:48:02
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\93-3\NEB305.txt unknown Seq: 22 31-MAR-15 11:41
2015] CHAFIN V. CHAFIN 771
December 7, 2010.156  The court rendered a final opinion on December
8, 2010.157  The entire appeals process was finished within fifty-seven
days of the trial court’s initial order.  Cases like Charalambous are
evidence enough that the United States is not only capable of imple-
menting expedited procedures similar to England and Wales, but has
already been practicing it in some circuits.
Finally, implementation is necessary to ensure that the strict stan-
dards are enforced within Convention proceedings.  Justice Ginsburg
noted that the “rulemakers [sic] and legislators might pay sustained
attention to the means by which the United States can best serve the
Convention’s aims.”158  The most uniform standard could be applied if
it were implemented at the legislative level.  Currently, ICARA re-
mains silent on the issue of appeals in Convention proceedings.159
Obviously the legislature has the power to create standards by which
courts are forced to use in every decision.  However, the recent U.S.
federal government shutdown160 is illustrative of the fact that it is
difficult to get any legislation passed currently or at any point in the
near future.  Thus, it is up to the courts in each jurisdiction within the
United States, to take up the changes on their own.  Though a much
slower process, case law will be established over time.  From the trial
to the appellate level of the proceedings, courts must work vigorously
to ensure that procedural delays are eliminated.161  In doing so, it is
possible to implement change, even without the help of the legislative
branch.
IV. CONCLUSION
The 1980 Hague Convention is an incredibly important tool for im-
plementing swift and final custody decisions for parents quarreling
across international borders.  Of course, that is the main purpose of
the 1980 Hague Convention: to find a solution that is in the best inter-
est of the child as quickly as possible.  But the United States has con-
tinually frustrated that purpose, first with circuit splits on the issue of
whether an appeal was allowed and now with the recent Chafin deci-
sion that failed to provide lower courts with a specific framework for
dealing with these types of cases in the future.  How the courts re-
spond to the Chafin decision is critical to further perfecting the 1980
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1030–31 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
159. See supra text accompanying note 22. R
160. The United States federal government was shut down from October 1 through 16,
2013.  The shutdown was instigated by disagreements on funds for the year 2014,
largely in part to Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, better known as
Obamacare.
161. Most courts are already in the habit of using expeditious procedures.  GARBOLINI,
supra note 153.  Thus, applying a uniform standard is the next step. R
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Hague Convention’s goals and international cooperation in achieving
the same.  Without a better system, the United States risks harming
families, destroying credibility with foreign nations, and ultimately
frustrating the purposes of the 1980 Hague Convention.
At this point, as with any domestic dispute, children are oftentimes
left without any ability to act for their own best interest.  For this rea-
son, expeditious procedures must be implemented, especially in cases
where a stay is not issued and the child returns to the foreign “habit-
ual residence.”  The longer the child is away from the United States,
the greater chance that the judicial system in that country will issue
custody determinations and disregard any further orders from the
United States.  Even if the foreign country recognized the validity of a
re-return order issued by the United States, the passage of time ulti-
mately decreases the child’s sense of stability and security.  Addition-
ally, the longer the child is out of United States, the less likely it is
that the court will determine that the “habitual residence” is in the
United States, simply because the longer the child is situated in one
country, especially at a young age, the less willing the court will be to
uproot the child again, solely for the purpose of an appeal.162  But
these negative effects of uprooting a child from his or her “home state”
can be avoided by providing courts with a simple framework for han-
dling these types of cases.
This is why adopting procedures similar to those in England and
Wales is such an important next step for the United States.  The court
proceedings in England and Wales, including the appellate procedure,
are fast-tracked to be completed within a six-week time.  Of course,
this is not always possible as the parties may not be willing or able to
complete the process in this time frame, but at least in those instances
the courts cannot be blamed for the lack of efficiency.  The legislature
has the most significant ability to change the 1980 Hague Convention
judicial landscape, but the system cannot afford to wait for legislative
guidance.  Instead, judges should work vigorously to ensure that pro-
cedural delays are eliminated, creating an environment where six-
week expedited procedures are not only possible, but become a reality.
162. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. R
